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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN C CRITCHLOW and 
SOPHIA CRITCHLOW, his wife, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
vs. 
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and 
LOIS CRITCHLOW, his wife; 
FUNNON T. SHIMMIN and 
DONNA SHIMMIN, his wife; 
and VERA SHIMMIN, 
Defendants and Respondents, 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
JAY L. CRITCHLOW and LOIS CRITCHLOW, his wife, and 
FUNNON T. SHIMMIN and DONNA SHIMMIN, his wife. 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE, DISPOSITION IN THE 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
ARE AS STATED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
THE FACTS AS STATED IN APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
ARE SUBSTANTIALLY CORRECT EXCEPT FOR THE 
FOLLOWING MODIFICATIONS AND ADDITIONS: 
A. There are other access roads to the property of 
Appellants (area colored green, Exhibit 1), that have been 
used over the years. (Tr 80, 81, 121, 139, 255). The 
Appellants contracted for the removal of timber in the 
green area in 1972 and vehicles were used to haul the 
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B. Critchlows did not obtain the property in green 
Exhibit 1, now owned by the Appellants, until 1943 (Tr 
76) and there was no road through Respondent Shimmins' 
property to the green area (Appellants' present property), 
until after 1948, In July of that year, Leon Chidester was 
hired to improve cattle trails off the mountain into the 
canyon going South from Appellants' present property 
toward Price, Utah, and he was paid for this job by Shim-
mins, Critchlows, and others (Tr 196). He was not hired 
or paid to build a road through Shimmins' property (Tr 
199). He could not get his Jeep to the top of the ridge 
(Appellants' land in green Exhibit 1), by going through 
Shimmins, so he lowered the blade on his bulldozer and 
cut a trail where the present road is located through 
Shimmins', so that he could haul gas with his Jeep to 
where his bulldozer was working. There was no road or 
trail prior, at that location, until Chidester went through 
with his bulldozer (Tr 189, 195, 197). Also confirmed 
by testimony of Vera Shimmins (Tr 228), Jay Critchlow 
(Tr 279), Sutton (Tr 211), Campbell (Tr 163, 164, 166), 
Eunnon T. Shimmin (Tr 241), and Frank World (Tr 203). 
C. After the bulldozer made the first trail in 1948, 
through the Shimmins' property, Respondent Shimmin 
then developed the road with his own equipment, at his 
own expense, for his own use, and without any contribu-
tion or help from the Appellants. The Appellant, John C. 
Critchlow, so testified (Tr 73). Funnon Shimmon testi-
fied that he worked on the road from 1948 to 1954 to 
make it passable and has continued to maintain the road 
since that time, without assistance from anyone (Tr 242, 
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249, 253). Also, see the testimony of Vera Shimmin (Tr 
228), and Cal Campbell (Tr 169). . 
D. The first lock on the gate No. 2, Exhibit 1, was 
placed there by Appellant, John Critchlow, when he 
fenced that portion of the range in about 1951, and that 
lock was torn off by Shimmin and replaced with his locks 
that he kept on the gate periodically from that time to the 
present. Shimmin even installed his own metal gate in 
1961 and took out the original gate placed in the fence by 
the Appellant (Tr 250, 252, 281). 
E. The gate ]Sfo. 3, Exhibit 1, was placed in the 
fence constructed by Shimmin in 1953 and 1954, and was 
placed there to allow cattle to exit the Shimmins' prop-
erty (Tr 244), and eventually Shimmin changed the route 
of the road North of the South line of Section 32, after 
the line was surveyed (Tr 243), and the road reached dead 
end at the Shimmin fence line and did not go through gate 
No. 4 (Tr 245). 
F. That before the partition suit between the Critch-
low brothers, 1971, they ran their cattle and serviced 
their range by going over the forty-acre tract (white area 
between the green and red, Exhibit 1), owned by Mathis, 
by horse back, on an exchange of use agreement with 
Mathis (Tr 66, 281). 
3 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THERE WAS COMPETENT EVIDENCE 
FROM WHICH THE COURT FOUND THAT 
THE USE OF THE ROAD ACROSS THE 
SHIMMINS PROPERTY BY APPELLANTS 
WAS PERMISSIVE, 
To establish a Right-of-Way by prescription, the use 
must be adverse and not permissive and must be under 
claim of right. It has been well established by this Court 
that the mere use of a roadway for twenty (20) years alone 
is insufficient to establish an Easement by prescription, 
but that such use must be adverse and under claim of right, 
and that it cannot be adverse when it rests upon license or 
mere neighborly accommodation. In Jensen vs. Gerrard, 
Et. AI., 85 Utah 481, 39 P. 2d 1070, the Court stated that 
the Defendants who claim a right to use a roadway by 
prescription have the burden to establish such claim by 
clear and satisfactory evidence, and that a 20-year use 
alone, of a way, is insufficient to establish an Easement, 
since the mere use of a roadway opened by a land owner 
for his own purpose will be presumed permissive, and ad-
verse use of the way cannot spring from permissive use, 
and further, that the prescriptive Title must be acquired 
adversely, and it cannot be adverse when it rests upon 
license or mere neighborly accommodation. 
To the same effect, is Sdrales, Et. Al. vs. Rondos, 116 
Utah 288, 209 P. 2d 562, decided in 1949, where the Court 
reaffirmed the ruling in Jensen vs. Gerrard and cited with 
approval, Harkness vs. Woodmanse, 7 Utah 227, 26 
P. 291, wherein the Court said, "Where a person opens a 
4 
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way for the use of his own premises and another person 
uses it also, without causing damage, the presumption is, 
in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that such use 
by the latter was permissive and not under claim of right." 
The Court, at that time, distinguished the facts in 
Zollinger vs. Frank, 110 Utah 514, 175 P. 2d 714, cited 
by the Appellant, since the facts in that case showed that 
the servient owner did not open the Right-of-Way for his 
own use, and he used only a portion of it infrequently, 
which is certainly not the facts as established in this case. 
To the same effect, is Bertolina, Et. Al. vs. Frates, 
Et. AL, 89 Utah 238, 57 P. 2d 348, wherein the Court 
states, "A user by an individual will be considered per-
missive and not adverse unless there is evidence that it 
was under a claim of right in himself, and that the owner, 
knowing of such claim, acquiesced in it" 
All of the evidence submitted to the Court in this 
case is to the effect that Mr. Shimmin permitted the Appel-
lants the use of the road and supplied them with a key 
r 32,. 251, 281), as a neighborly gesture to allow them 
the permissive use of his road (Tr 251, 253, 265) that he 
built and maintained, (Tr 73, 169, 228, 242, 249, 253), 
and at no time did he acquiesce in any claim of right in the 
Plaintiffs to the use of the road. 
From the time that Mr. Chidester first ran his bull-
dozer through the sage brush and rocks (1948), Mr. Shim-
min, without assistance from the Plaintiffs in either labor 
or money, and using his own equipment, developed and 
5 
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made the road passable for his own use. He even built 
one completely new section of the road on the South 
boundary of his property, in 1952 (Tr 243, 245), over 
which the Appellants now claim a Right-of-Way. There-
fore, the presumption is present that the use by the Appel-
lants was permissive and not under any claim of right. 
Not only does the presumption exist, but the facts 
further substantiate and show that the use was permissive, 
since the Appellants used the road by obtaining a key to 
the locked gate placed on the road by Shimmin in approxi-
mately 1955 and continued to use the road thereafter by 
use of the key supplied by Shimmin (Tr 251, 253, 281), 
and even called him and requested a key, in 1972 (Tr 254), 
which clearly shows that they used the road by his per-
mission and not under any claim of right or adversely. 
They were not free to use the road as they pleased, but 
only to use the road if they had a key supplied to them by 
Mr. Shimmin. Any gates placed across the road were 
established for Mr. Shimmin's use and not in any recogni-
tion of any right in the Plaintiffs. 
The case of Rippentrop vs. Pickering, 15 Utah 2d 
59, 387 P. 2d 94, decided in 1963, affirmed the prior 
holding of the Court in Lunt vs. Kitchens, 123 Utah 488, 
260 P. 2d 535, which case stated as follows: 
"If, of course, the landowner consents to the use 
of his land, then the right created is a license and 
a prescriptive right cannot arise from a license un-
less the licensee renounces openly his claim under 
the license." 
However, it is obvious that where a special re-
lationship such as a license exists, the owner of the 
6 
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land is entitled to more notice than the mere use 
, of his land not inconsistent with the license. Thus 
it is said in the Restatement of Property #458J: 
*'Where a use of land and one having an interest 
affected by the use have a relationship to each 
other sufficient in itself to justify the use, the use 
is not adverse unless knowledge of its adverse 
character is had by the one whose interest is affect-
ed. The responsibility of bringing this knowledge 
to him lies in the Qne making the use." 
No evidence was presented to the Court that the 
Appellants claimed a right to use the road adverse to the 
interest of Shimmin or that Shimmin at any time ever 
had any notice or knowledge that the Appellants claimed 
a right adverse to Shimmin, until 1968, when Shimmin 
received the letter from the Appellants' then Attorney, 
Luke G. Pappas (Exhibit 17), who wanted to discuss the 
use of the road with Shimmin. At that time, Appellants 
were told and informed that they were using the road by 
permission and as a neighborly accommodation, and that 
there was nothing to negotiate (Tr 254). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COM-
MIT ERROR IN ITS FAILURE TO DECREE 
THAT APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
.-•*•• WAY OF NECESSITY OVER THE PROP-
ERTY OF THE RESPONDENTS CRITCHLOW. 
At the opening of the Trial it was Stipulated that 
none of the property partitioned to the Plaintiffs in the 
partition suit (Defendants' Exhibit 21) is contiguous to 
that which was partitioned to the Respondents Critch-
low (Tr 6). 
7 
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A "way of necessity" over the property of the Re-
spondents Critchlow being entirely dependent upon the 
question of whether the Plaintiffs have a prescriptive ease-
ment over the property of the Respondent Shimmin; and 
the Trial Court, having heard and observed the witnesses 
of the respective parties, and weighed their testimony; and 
the Court having concluded, from a preponderance of the 
evidence that Plaintiffs' use of the alleged roadway over 
the property of the Respondents Shimmin was permissive, 
and not adverse, hostile, notorious or antagonistic to the 
rights of the Respondents Shimmin; and that Plaintiffs 
failed to establish a right of way over the lands of the Re-
spondents Shimmin by prescription or otherwise; the Trial 
Court could not find and conclude otherwise than that 
the Plaintiffs were not entitled to a "way of necessity" 
over the lands of the Respondents Critchlow. 
POINT III 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ER-
ROR IN FAILING TO AWARD DAMAGE 
The Appellants not only failed to establish any Right-
of-Way, but failed to prove any damage. The Appellants 
put on evidence of expense incurred in moving their cattle 
to another area, but did not show that they suffered any 
damage or loss. They may have made a profit as a result 
of the move. All cattle operations have expense, but they 
are not all losses. 
^8 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court had sufficient and adequate evidence 
presented to it from which a finding could be made that 
the use of the alleged roadway over the Shimmins' prop-
erty was permissive; that no "way of necessity" over the 
Respondents Critchlow was acquired; and that Appellants 
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